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
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
# Forward Deployment in the 1970's and 1980's

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BY

⑩ Herbert G. Hagerty  
Department of State



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#### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR**

Herbert G. Hagerty is a Foreign Service Officer currently serving as Political Officer, Department of State, American Embassy, London. He has served in the American Embassies in New Delhi and in Oslo and with the Department of State in Washington, DC. His military service was with the US Navy. He received a BA degree from Columbia University and an MA degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He is a 1976 graduate of The National War College.

(cont. p. 3)

# FOREWORD

Forward deployment and overseas basing policies have long been critical to the United States' defense posture. This ~~evocative~~ study of the rationale for forward deployment is particularly timely in an era of re-evaluation and consideration of alternative policies.

*The author*  
Mr. Hagerty's examination suggests that the United States needs a better, more cohesive approach to the establishment of an overseas basing posture; one in which both military and political necessities should be considered.

This monograph is another in a series of papers written by Students and Faculty Members conducting research at The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and by National Defense University Research Fellows.

*H. Lobdell, Jr.*  
H. LOBDELL, JR.  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant

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## **FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IN THE 1970's AND 1980's**

### **Introduction**

American policymaking today is in the hands of a whole generation of leaders and officials who cut their teeth and learned their lessons on the problems and conditions of the post-World War II world—an era in which American military and economic supremacy, coupled with American political and technological leadership, were the givens. They are accustomed to doing business in ways which reflect this power and influence; their patterns, procedures, and institutions have evolved against this background. And on the whole, they have been successful in protecting and advancing American interests, especially in the main arena of political and military challenge, the postwar confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The world is changing, however, and the outlines of the Soviet threat are being blurred as the more subtle considerations of a multipolar world order have their impact on the United States and its allies and friends. At the same time, American supremacy and leadership are being challenged, and the United States is learning that there are some things even the richest economy in the world cannot afford. Unaccustomed need for choice is being forced on us by competing demands for resources and by resurgent requirements of sovereignty among our allies and friends.

Nowhere is this more noticeable than in the changes which are underway in the basing structure which supports our forward defense strategy. This study looks at our basing problems overseas as they face policymakers in the real world of national strategy decisionmaking in the late 1970's. It has a global outlook, as global indeed as the interests and the capabilities of the United States of America. That alone may make it unique, since it does not focus on or address the specifics of any regional or bilateral basing system, contingency scenario, or negotiation.

Rather, it is a study which attempts to take a new look at the American overseas basing structure as it is being impacted by changing technology, diminished or otherwise changing threat perceptions, more selective and graduated alliance relationships, and shifts within the world power system. It acknowledges contraction in the system but attempts to redefine the essentiality of an overseas basing structure to a strategy of forward defense—which the author has assumed to be not merely a fixed aspect of American strategic thought but also a concept

of continuing validity. It suggests that the habits of a generation may require changing if we are to preserve the essentials of the system and the assured access to it which remain critical to our own defense and to our collective defense commitments.

### Forward Defense—Evolution of a Strategy

*Even if the intention of war is only the maintenance of the existing situation . . . still the mere parrying of a blow is something quite contradictory to the term of war, because the conduct of war is no mere state of endurance.*

—Clausewitz

**Definitions:** The terms "forward defense," "forward deployment," "forward basing," and "forward strategy" are not all synonymous. In traditional Anglo-Saxon usage, "forward" has a positive connotation, suggesting action and vigor, as opposed to the perjorative associations of inactivity and passivity. For example, the British Indian Government characterized its activist, even interventionist, policies toward Afghanistan during the last century as a "forward policy;" those opposed to this policy advocated an approach which they themselves characterized as "masterly inactivity," which was difficult to sell.

American usage in connection with the terms noted above is meant also to suggest an active policy, attuned to the American predilection for action, for controlling events rather than being controlled by them.

Thus, all of the terms above suggest carrying the battle to the prospective enemy and giving him little or no quarter in the areas between his and our frontiers. This was, of course, the lesson of two world wars in this century which were fought in areas other than the North American continent itself. Throughout this study, the terms "forward defense" and "forward strategy" will be used interchangeably and in their broadest sense to suggest this concept, without reference to any special tactical connotations these terms may have in NATO parlance.

*The author defines* as  
• "Forward deployment" will refer specifically to the regular assignment of US military forces to bases and facilities around the defense perimeter which, with our allies' consent and support, we have established overseas. • "Forward basing" will refer to both the base and operating rights structure which supports these regularly deployed mili-

tary forces as well as any other forces <sup>of ours</sup> we may choose to project; in its broadest sense, "forward basing" refers not simply to dedicated US or common defense basing and facilities and rights but also to that web of agreement and practice which governs access to nondedicated bases and facilities. \* → (cont on p. 2)

**Historical Evolution.** Virtually every American school child is aware of America's efforts, through most its history, to insulate itself from the conflicts and rivalries of the world; George Washington recommended it, and his successors—with rare exception—made it policy. We have been equally suspicious of, and antagonistic to, the idea of large standing military establishments in time of peace. Thus, the combination since 1950 of large standing forces and their commitment to the defense of allies far from our shores is without precedent in our history.

What few overseas installations the US used in the years prior to World War II were in support of the far-flung possessions which we acquired at the turn of the century in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. Some projection of American forces took place on the eve of US entry into the war as a result of the 99-year base rights we acquired from Great Britain in Bermuda, New Foundland, Jamaica, Trinidad, and St. Lucia at the time of the surplus destroyer deal. These rights, together with base rights in Iceland and the Azores (occupied by American forces in 1941 and 1943 respectively), as well as in the UK itself, were critical to the projection of American power in and across the Atlantic basin throughout the war.

Most of our prewar forward bases in the Pacific were overrun by the Japanese by mid-1942, and much of the hard campaigning that followed was aimed at restoring our position in these (and other) forward areas in order to bring our power to bear directly on the enemy in his home islands<sup>1</sup>

By September 1945, following the end of the war and not counting the occupation facilities then being established by our forces in Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, and Korea, we controlled hundreds of installations outside the US. Maintenance of the supply lines to our occupation forces overseas required continued use of many of these installations well into the early postwar period, despite our headlong rush to demobilize. New agreements extended or renewed several wartime operating and transit agreements, and as the initial signs of the collapse of the US-Soviet wartime partnership began to appear, additional overseas facilities and deployments were sought and undertaken. Naval units, the precursor to the Sixth Fleet, deployed to the Mediter-

anean in 1946, continued US access to Subic Bay and Clark Field was retained following Philippine independence in 1947, and US access, mainly to runways, was assured in Libya (Wheelus), Saudi Arabia (Dhahran), Bahrain, and Iceland.

These arrangements and deployments were taken, of course, against the background of a steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations and mounting concern that the Kuomintang Government in China would not survive the communist wave as well. Soviet meddling in Greece and Iran, communist insurrections in Malaya, Indochina, India, and the Philippines, the Soviet clampdown on Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade, communist victory in Peking, and, at length, the first shots of the Korean War focused attention on the worsening prospects for peace. Public support grew for the US and Western responses—the Rio Pact, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the policy of containment. And it was the policy of containment which, *inter alia*, called for strong military forces capable, if necessary, of applying the “logic of force” to a Soviet state which seemed “imperious to the logic of reason,” to quote George Kennan’s words.<sup>2</sup>

Our reactions were conditioned by the still-vivid memory of the failure of appeasement at Munich and of the efficacy of common defense efforts among the allies during the war. Growing awareness of the implications of nuclear power, coupled with the still-fresh impressions of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment alone, led us first—and for some time—to rely upon strategic air power to deter the threat of Soviet aggression.<sup>3</sup> As a result, and because of the great intercontinental distances involved, many of our early deployments forward were aimed at acquiring air bases from which it would have been possible to stage and recover strategic bombing missions against the USSR. The establishment of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean in this time period provided a visible earnest of our will to the nations of the littoral, while providing also additional aircraft staging facilities afloat.

More facilities were acquired and/or converted to this postwar use as a consequence of the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951 and stationing agreements with our NATO allies. During the Korean War period of the 1950’s, our ground force installations overseas began to take on some permanence, and new air and naval installations were developed or reopened in England, Spain, Greenland, Canada, Iceland, the Azores, Morocco, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. So important was the basing impulse that John Foster Dulles, soon to become Secretary of State Dulles and a prime mover in the evolution of our alliance structure overseas, saw basing as the major advantage to the inclusion of Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, and even Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

Implicit in the energies and resources the United States threw into rearming itself and its allies, was the hope and expectation that concerted multilateral action, either through the UN or in accordance with the collective security provisions of the UN Charter, would deter potential aggressors from risking wider conflict which would involve direct damage to North America.<sup>5</sup> Implicit also was the unstated assumption that containment need not be a long-lasting policy. Rather we believed, as Dr. Kissinger has recently observed, that "the world's security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort," that such a policy, in the end, would "transform the Soviet Union, and that a changed Soviet society would then evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious international community."<sup>6</sup>

While President Truman's difficulties in getting public support for more defense spending during this period were formidable,<sup>7</sup> a remarkable aspect of these formative years in our postwar evolution is that few seemed to have opposed the forward deployment strategy *per se*. Opposition to our greater and more direct involvement in affairs outside the US rested heavily on the old arguments—in part at least discredited—of isolationism. Those who accepted wider involvement—and after the North Koreans marched south in June 1950 this included a broad spectrum of American opinion, regardless of their specific view of the Korean War—appear to have swallowed forward deployment for American forces almost axiomatically. Concerns by some, like Henry Wallace,<sup>8</sup> about how our actions might actually feed Soviet paranoia went virtually unnoticed. In fact, mounting evidence of Soviet sensitivity to the ring of bases around its periphery served rather to persuade many that we were doing the right thing.

**Pluses and Minuses:** The advantages of "forward deployment" were, of course, obvious to all. Politically, our presence assured the Europeans that they were not alone, that US forces would be involved at the outset were the Russians to make a move into Western Europe, and that Europe would be our "first line of defense."<sup>9</sup> These considerations still obtain.

Moreover, forward deployment of forces based on fixed bases (and supported where appropriate by mobile seaborne forces as well) offered us, then as now, the capability for defense in-depth, with early warning of impending danger. It afforded us the opportunity to conduct training operations, alone and with our allies, in areas most likely to be contested in any future conflict. Then, as now, it gave us operational options and dispersion right at the enemy's door, while immensely

complicating his own offensive targetting and defensive planning. We also learned and appreciated the lesson that overseas bases which support our forward deployment in alliance areas can also be convenient to our general global force posture in time of peace and to our unilateral purposes outside the immediate alliance area, in time of crisis. This is a wasting asset, however, as will be noted later.

In contrast to these advantages, the disadvantages of forward deployment were—and remain—mainly ones of proximity to the enemy (the other side of our advantage) and the politics of alliances. *Pravda* summed up the first succinctly in 1957 by noting that "... if these bases are close to us, they are also not far from us."<sup>10</sup> Forward defense reduced to some degree our flexibility, at least in terms of denying us the option of noninvolvement. Fixed bases are expensive to build and maintain. They can be pinpointed, an important disadvantage in the missile age and one not shared to the same degree—as yet—by forces afloat; however, reductions in service forces and increasing reliance on shore-based aircraft for maritime surveillance and on fixed overseas ports for bunkering and maintenance are reducing some of the mobility advantage of seaborne forces.

Politically, forces deployed in forward bases have also raised questions of risk—to our hosts and to us—as well as protection. This has been a frequent theme of Soviet propaganda and of Communist Party agitation.<sup>11</sup>

Beyond the matter of Soviet exploitation, the politics of alliance also intrude, involving us in suballiance or regional enmities irrelevant to our broader concerns but important enough to one or the other of our allies to merit, in his eyes, a serious claim to our support. Within NATO, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is a classic illustration; so also is Iceland's battle with the UK over fishing limits. Elsewhere, irrelevant enmities have complicated our dealings in both South and Southeast Asia. The problem has a reverse twist as well, as witness NATO Europe's reluctance to support our actions beyond the alliance area even when—as in the 1973 crisis in the Middle East—the ramifications of events are wider than mere American interest or concern. In any event, by the early 1950's America's leadership, with strong bipartisan support and without serious objection, had embarked on a policy of limiting Soviet power using a military strategy, which combined deterrence with forward deployment in support of multinational alliances. But in the words of Samuel Huntington, it was not the alliances which were the "major innovation" in the evolution of US policy; rather it was the "indefinite deployment of American forces in

Europe, under an international command headed by an American general."<sup>12</sup>

And unique too, as it remains today. But the various decisions underpinning this great commitment were supported solidly by the costly lessons we had been learning in our relations with the world beyond the Western Hemisphere during this century. Those lessons had begun to jell by 1950 into a national consensus that: (1) the United States could no longer avoid a continuing involvement in world affairs; (2) Western Europe is *the* most important area, among those far from our shores in terms of American national security; (3) maximum deterrence, as well as maximum ability to influence events if fighting ever does erupt, is best assured by the deployment of forces in forward areas, supported and prepared to carry the fight to the enemy if need be; and (4) our European experience is at least partially translatable to other areas as well.

Today, in an era of flexible response, of detente-mindedness,\*\* and of budding Soviet globalism, these considerations remain as operative as ever, as valid, in fact, as the alliance systems of which they are inextricably a part.<sup>13</sup> But those alliances are themselves undergoing changes as the world situation evolves from the threatening moves and language of the early days of the cold war to the more subtle contest for power and influence of today.

Attitudinal changes are taking place, among the publics at large and within the governments ruling and representing them—and this goes beyond mere historical revisionism. The confident assumptions of mutual interest, unavoidable danger, and shared risk underlying our overseas base and operating rights environment are eroding. These changes would be difficult to deal with in any event, but Soviet capabilities to project military power and influence beyond the "contained" Eurasian heartland, which are growing and being supported themselves by a modest but growing base and operating rights structure, make our task even more difficult and urgent.

#### Overseas Basing and Operating Rights—The Structure

*We need combat forces in being, ready for immediate deployment . . . widely disposed on strategic airbases, and capable of rapid concentration anywhere, over suitable airways and connecting bases.*

—"Touey" Spaatz  
General, USAF, 1948<sup>14</sup>

*An overseas basing structure, supported by essential operating rights—such as staging and overflight—continues to be important to our ability to carry out foreign obligations and support the foreign and security policies of the United States . . .*

—William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State, 1971<sup>15</sup>

These two quotations, 23 years apart, suggest a continuity of policy throughout the period of development of our overseas base structure. The evolution of the network of bases and rights did not, however, follow a master plan. Rather, the basing structure, as well as the overflight and staging rights associated with it, developed haphazardly over the years as a result of *ad hoc* decisions, in response to specific events, requirements, and technological developments. This holds true equally for barracks in Germany, airfields in Morocco and Thailand, or naval facilities in Japan.

Changing political trends and continuing technological advances have kept—and continue to keep—our overall basing structure in a dynamic state. Every year there are changes which result in abandonment, consolidation, realignment, relocation, contraction, and, at times, expansion of existing facilities, at home as well as abroad. Through the years 1948 through 1964, the overall trend tended to be upward in numbers; in the years since 1965—and excluding those installations developed in Vietnam specifically for prosecution of the war there—the trend has been slowly downward.

All bases, facilities, and military installations overseas serve an important political function. In varying degrees, they combine presence with reassurance, and in general they show the flag to friend and foe alike. This is universal.

Beyond this, nearly every installation at home or abroad serves one or more of four broad functions, regardless of the circumstances of its establishment and however much its original functions may have evolved or been modified. These functions, which cover both wartime and peacetime usage, are:

(1) *support of strategic forces*; specifically, this translates into airbases for bomber and tanker aircraft of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and into port and support facilities for fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's);

(2) *support locally for forward deployed general purpose forces:* the range of activities is wide, from *kasernes* in Germany to airfields in Japan and Spain to port and repair facilities at Diego Garcia, Subic Bay, or Rota;

(3) *en route support for augmentation and for strategic forces* carrying out routine logistic and rotational activities in time of peace and supporting the projection of American military power in time of crisis; or,

(4) *technical support activities*, that is, acting as a platform with unique geographic or other qualities and providing direct support to other functions noted above or to specific technical requirements. These various activities include, *inter alia*, communications relay, space and weather monitoring, research and development testing and calibrating, early warning and intelligence collection, and search and rescue (SAR) operations.

Facilities in category (4) above will not feature prominently in this study; many, of course, are overshadowed by the larger installations on which they are frequently tenants. Where separate from large and multipurpose military installations, such activities are frequently innocuous, uncontroversial, routine in operation, and not associable with any specific foreign policy action or objective (or even with any quantifiable rise or fall in activity).

Since we spend the largest slice of our defense dollar on general purpose forces, it should come as no surprise that the bulk of our installations overseas—in terms of facilities of significant size and importance—is in the second and third functional areas described above, i.e., in support of general purpose forces already deployed or as part of our planned augmentation and resupply system in time of crisis. As one might also expect, the concentration of our forces overseas corresponds directly with our alliance commitments which the basing enables us to honor. In fact, the bulk of our overseas installations and activities are those associated with US Army units deployed in large numbers in the Federal Republic of Germany and in South Korea. Beyond these, our installations overseas, while spanning the globe, are nonetheless concentrated in a relatively few countries or locations; 85 percent for instance, are located in but seven countries or locations.

In specific numbers, these observations translate as follows:<sup>16</sup>

(1) as of early 1976, the Department of Defense (DOD) main-

tained a total of 328 "selected," i.e., consequential, installations and activities in 24 countries or other overseas areas;

(2) some 289 of these were in seven countries or locations, with West Germany heading the list with 185; Japan/Okinawa followed with 34, South Korea with 29, the Canal Zone with 12, the UK with 11, and the Philippines and Italy with 9 each.

These figures are misleading, however, because they count each *kaserne* in Germany—regardless of how clustered—as well as other activities which are actually part of a larger base complex. A more meaningful breakdown, taking account of this clustering, reduces the list to around 200 bases, facilities, or installations of significant size or importance. Of these:

(1) more than half—95 Army complexes and 10 air bases—are in West Germany where they support and house our largest concentration of military manpower overseas;

(2) again more than half—concentrated in six geographic areas (including Germany)—are Army associated;

(3) about one-third are airfields of one Service association or another in a relatively larger number of countries or other overseas locations like the Canal Zone or Diego Garcia;

(4) Navy stations and bases number approximately 32 in 15 countries or locations; US Air Force stations and bases number some 49 also in 15 countries or locations.

It should also be noted, as a further clarification, that in several important locations around the globe, the Air Force and the Navy share aviation facilities which are counted by DOD on only one or the other's list as host. The USN airfield at Keflavik in Iceland, for instance, hosts USAF interceptors and SAR aircraft; the USAF field at Lajes (actually a Portuguese Air Force airfield) hosts USN maritime reconnaissance aircraft, etc. Airfields nominally under USN control also support and are served by USAF aircraft of the Military Airlift Command (MAC).\*\*\*

Furthermore, aircraft and ships have in common the ability to use and to be supported by ordinary commercial port and aviation facilities. While they may find it convenient to use dedicated US or military facilities, the availability of such facilities is not a necessary element of

their support, especially in peacetime. For ships especially, port calls are a routine part of operating in forward areas, and such visits involve bunkering, some maintenance and resupply opportunities, as well as the three "R's" of rest, recreation, and representation—the last an important political byproduct. MAC aircraft of the USAF are similarly a familiar sight at many commercial or shared military-commercial airfields in such diverse locations as Oslo, Bangkok, Managua, Karachi, Monrovia, Athens, Amman, Addis Ababa, and Ascension Island.<sup>17</sup>

As noted previously, the present trend in our overseas presence is downward. American military personnel deployed overseas have declined since the 1958-63 high point of somewhat more than one million (not counting Vietnam) in 30 countries to about one-half million in 24 countries at the end of 1976.<sup>18</sup> This reduction has been accomplished both through realigning functions and reducing the number of Americans (and bases) within specific countries. Thus, we have reduced the number of bases from about 700 in 1957-58 to a little over 400 in the late 1960's and to the 328 noted above for 1975. Evidence that the United States is committed to a continuing pattern of such reductions and realignments was contained in the Report of the Secretary of State to the President for 1970 which states that the United States desires "to maintain such bases only where they are necessary . . . and to seek to eliminate (in consultation with host governments) those which are no longer needed . . ."<sup>19</sup> This policy remains in effect today and is operative in recently-concluded as well as in ongoing negotiations in several countries.

The bulk of the recent reductions has taken place in terms of general purpose forces facilities. Earlier reductions, that is, from the plateau of 1958-63 were more mixed and resulted from a variety of causes, some political, some highly technical. DeGaulle's decision to compel the withdrawal of NATO forces from French soil, for instance, resulted in the closure of more than 100 American installations, large and small. Most of these were not duplicated in other locations; rather, functions were absorbed elsewhere through consolidation and realignment. The abrupt turn of events in Libya, following the overthrow of King Idris some years ago, forced a complete withdrawal from the USAF training complex at Wheelus, for which no adequate replacement has yet been found.

Technological changes are frequently more subtle; such is the case of the impact of satellites on the need for ground-based communications and intelligence sites. More dramatic, perhaps, is the absolute reduction of dependence on overseas facilities for the key elements of

our strategic triad (base function [1] noted above). In the immediate post-World War II period, our basing requirements overseas stemmed mainly from our dependence for strategic deterrence on medium-range bombers which required staging bases to reach the Soviet Union from the US. The advent of the truly intercontinental B-52 reduced this requirement, but staging bases are still needed overseas for SAC tanker aircraft. This requirement is now significantly reduced from what it once was—no more than a handful of airfields. It should also be noted that while the SAC bombers have first call on the aerial tanker force in time of crisis, the tankers are also important in support of tactical and airlift forces as well.

The declining requirement for bomber bases overseas was balanced briefly by the need for overseas launching sites for the Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) in the late 1950's. They soon gave way, however, to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—based in the United States proper—and the development also of the fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarine weapons system.

The advent of the Trident FBM system will permit even further reduction in our dependence on basing on foreign soil for support—the result mainly of its longer-range missiles which will permit the SSBN to be on active patrol from the moment it departs US facilities in the Western Hemisphere. This should, in time, obviate the need for overseas SSBN support facilities such as that located at Rota in Spain. \*\*\*\*

*Summing Up.* On the whole, the changes catalogued above—whether for domestic or foreign political reasons or for reasons of technological advance—have not significantly impaired our capabilities to support a strategy of forward defense based on forward deployment of forces. The changes have frequently complicated our planning; they have inconvenienced us, for instance, in routing MAC or other aircraft; and we have lost certain irreplaceable training areas which are important in time of peace.

Many of the changes, over time, were at our own instance, induced by the march of technology in the strategic area of such range and destructiveness as to permit us to become virtually independent of staging facilities overseas. The development of a so-called supertanker aircraft—actually a wide-body cargo/tanker—called for in President Ford's budget proposals—can accelerate this move toward absolute independence from foreign basing, with respect to both the manned-bomber mission as well as the high-priority strategic lift mission.<sup>20</sup> Initial outlays, as well as operating costs, will be high, however.

But it is in the political arena—with erosion of alliance solidarity and dimmed perceptions of threat—where our difficulties are greatest. And it is not so much a matter of dealing with a potential all-out war situation as it is in normal peacetime or localized crisis operations which are the ordinary routine of our deployed forces and which exercise the operating rights essential to ensure the availability of the base in the event of wider conflict. These difficulties can limit our freedom of action and cripple our ability to project and support forces and materiel. It is this thorny context which we will next address.

#### **Bases, Allies, and Friends—The Changing Milieu**

*Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies, there must be lean years.*

—Lao-tse, 6th century B.C.

*The whole matter of foreign bases is so closely allied to other matters that it is difficult to consider bases as a problem apart. Seapower, strategic airpower, military airlift, nuclear weapons for allies, collective defense arrangements, strategic intelligence, the advantages of "showing the flag," and the costs of the quid pro quos [paid] to host countries are [but] some of the factors entering in consideration [in examining] of basing arrangements.*

—House of Representatives, 1961<sup>21</sup>

The provision and acquisition of operating bases and operating rights on foreign soil, in foreign waters, and in foreign airspace has been near the heart of the transaction of alliance in which the United States has participated extensively in the post-World War II period. Expressed simply, and keeping in mind the complex of factors noted by the House Committee above, the bases provided by our allies have enabled the US, as the more powerful member of the alliance, to contribute directly to the forward defense of its own interests while also defending the interests and the territory of its less powerful but more exposed alliance partners. The presence afforded by the base rights has been a vivid reminder, and assurance, to the lesser partner that the United States will, in fact, honor its defense commitment by being involved right at the start of any confrontation which may occur in the forward area of the alliance. The provision of base and operating rights to the United States may, in itself, be the most important contribution the lesser

power makes to its own defense and to the strength and vitality of the collective security arrangement as a whole.

Other elements are related, as the House Committee correctly noted. These include commitments we have made to help our allies strengthen their own defense capabilities so that they may make an additional contribution to their own defense, however disparate that strength may be, vis-a-vis the enemy or their alliance partners. Over the years, and intended or not, the whole question of military assistance has become caught up itself in the base rights business, with the quantum of military (and frequently economic) aid being tied popularly to basing and operating rights. This is an important change element in our base rights milieu because of the general wind-down of the massive foreign assistance programs of the 1950's and 1960's. Continuing congressional and popular pressure on this issue is aimed at reducing spending abroad, getting our allies to spend more of their own resources for defense, and shifting the basis for military assistance programs increasingly from the older grant and direct credit basis to the more preferable to us guaranteed credit or cash basis.

The question of appropriate *quid pro quo* for basing overseas brings us, in fact, to the major problem we are having today with our overseas network, a problem which will grow more difficult if current trends continue. And while *quid pro quo* considerations highlight the problem, the issues are political and fundamental to the alliance structures to which we have committed ourselves. The Lao-tse comment above gets at part of the problem; so also does an observation by a National War College lecturer in 1954 that "base development [in peacetime] on the territory of a friendly nation must *always* compromise, to some degree, the sovereignty of that nation."<sup>22</sup>

Simply put, our ability to continue to use facilities in a foreign nation to support our far-flung military forces rests fundamentally on the degree to which we and that nation have shared interests, whether or not these are stated in some formal way (e.g., a treaty, a base agreement, etc.). In the case of countries not linked formally with the United States by treaty or agreement, the use of facilities—airfields and ports—is simply a friendly act, mirroring the current state of relationships; ships of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets call routinely at Tunis and Singapore, respectively; they do not call at ports in Libya or Cambodia.

In the case of allies, or at least with countries with which we have some sort of formal instrument authorizing and regulating the presence, access, and activities of US military forces at military installations on

their soil, the arrangement is explicit. It has international standing; it specifies mutual obligations; and it reflects the state of relations—perceptions and interests—at the time it was negotiated. Successive negotiations, extensions, and consultations help to keep such arrangements consonant with the evolving situation in the world and with the evolving relationship between the US and the host country. Negotiations to renew a treaty or a base or operating agreement are an occasion formally to update this mutual understanding; periodic consultations, even something as broad and general as the semiannual communiques of the NATO foreign and defense ministers, accomplish the same purpose at a more basic level.

Most of our alliance-cum-basing relationships were formed in the early days of the “cold war” confrontation between the United States and its allies on one hand and the Soviet Union and its vassals on the other. The world appeared divided into two hostile camps, and the threat of war loomed large, with widespread nuclear devastation as a consequence. The communist threat seemed indivisible and all threats to the peace, whether or not they emanated directly from the Soviet side, were perceived in the context of hardline positions East and West.

US military strength was perceived by our allies as the essential guarantor of their sovereignty; US military operations abroad, whether or not directly related to the “cold war” confrontation in the heart of Europe, for instance, could nonetheless be cast in terms of the security, protection, and strength of the “Free World.” Friends and allies—our hosts—did not concern themselves in detail with every detailed purpose to which the facilities and the forces using them were put. Host nations preferred, in those halcyon days, to regard the protection afforded by the US presence, coupled with the security assistance it frequently brought, as sufficient to balance out whatever Lao-tse-like inconveniences might arise from our presence. This overstates the point, of course; nations normally did not surrender total control over their land or air space. Early operating rights agreements did specify some conditions on usage, usually stated generally in the context of some relationship with the purpose of the alliance and requiring consultation on new uses. But the atmosphere was very friendly; American presence was generally welcome; and questions were usually resolved in favor of the United States. And there were, in some instances, carryover benefits from our previous occupation or proprietary status.

In recent years, the transactional situation has become markedly different. While there may be doubts about whether the world has become truly multipolar, the bipolarity of the early 1950's is certainly

gone. There is a new pluralism in the world resulting in new and multiple groupings, with new interrelationships, some based on a security matrix, many based on other primary issues. Booming prosperity in the East and the West, coupled with new and newer nationalisms, are shaping international relationships in a much more fluid arena. Regularization of the relations between the two Germanies, progress toward detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, negotiations on arms limitation, normalization of American relations with China, greater subtlety in Soviet policy, and, in general, an abatement of the harshest outlines of the "cold war" struggle have reduced the threat of war between the US and the USSR. The major coincidence of interests and perceptions which cemented our alliance relationships remains, but the focus is narrower.

Even our best and closest allies cannot fail to be aware that their interests and ours simply do not—or seem not to—coincide as completely, as frequently, and as easily as they once did. All of this comes at a time when, by virtue of its own massive defense expenditures and its nurturing of potential basing sites abroad, the Soviet Union is becoming a global superpower "with no part of the world outside the range of its military forces."<sup>1</sup>

Nations which play host to US military installations are increasingly concerned—in terms of their own national interest—about the actual purposes to which our bases, our forces, and our operating rights are put. In one way or another, host nations want now to be assured:

(1) that US actions at or from or through these facilities are in consonance with the terms of the original agreement on presence and usage;

(2) that US actions at or through these installations—if not spelled out in the agreement—are at least consistent with the purposes and policies with which the host government wishes at present to be associated; and, conversely

(3) that US actions supported or sustained through these installations do not somehow involve the host government in situations or pose risks which are inconsistent with its own perception of its interests.

A dramatic illustration of this concern is to be found in the divergence of policy between the US and many of its European allies during our urgent resupply of Israel during the hard fighting in the Middle East in the fall of 1973; while we in the United States can perceive that our

actions then furthered our interests and the interests of the "Free World" as well, our European allies were more cautious, were concerned about their dependence on Arab petroleum, and were anxious also about the possibility of expanding the southern flank of the NATO area to include the Middle East.

This situation posed major difficulties for us in the extraction of US materiel from depots in western Europe, as well as in the choice of routing for our aerial resupply operations to Israel. Staging and support were also difficult, forcing absolute reliance on the airfield at Lajes in the Azores.<sup>24</sup> Now, two years later, the C-5A has an exercised capability for aerial refueling<sup>25</sup>—thus obviating the need for Lajes if the C-5A were to be used for the same type of airlift. But we would be hard-pressed to deliver the same amount of materiel by air in the same period of time without facilities en route for tanker staging or without accepting the exorbitant costs of using current tanker aircraft operating from the US alone.

In more general terms, the basic alliance transaction—value received and value given—has become unbalanced in the eyes of many nations who feel the need to assert national interests in connection with our military operations from their soil, in their waters, or in their airspace. There is a bit of legacy from the Vietnam era in all of this, but it is broader than that. Scarcely a negotiation now underway does not produce some new effort to redress or refine this delicate area.

The most direct form is, of course, the request by a host government for the US to close down or significantly reduce the number of people or activities at some overseas installation. The request to close down a facility may also result from other factors, such as safety or ecological concerns, changes in the political complexion of the local governmental authority, or even land-use pressures, such as those caused by the growth of population centers in the direction of large military complexes, turning what was once inexpensive, open land of little economic value into desirable commercial property.

The other side of the coin, of course, can be a dramatic increase in the host government's demands for payment (*quid pro quo*) for allowing us to continue the same pattern of operations for a new period. This reflects at once a devaluation of the protection value of our presence and of the facilities—in a time of diminished perceptions of the threat of war—and a revaluation of the political costs to the host nation of our continuing presence and activities. When combined with rising doubts abroad—after Vietnam—of our value as an ally and widespread concern

that Soviet military capabilities are outstripping ours, such demands can become tantamount to a request for withdrawal. Implicit is a concern that our presence, rather than enhancing the security of the host country, may in some instances increase the risks to which the host country is exposing itself.

Revaluation of the transaction can produce less drastic demands as well. We can be requested to vacate only a portion of a base or to remove from a base some specific activities of concern to the host government, e.g., the USAF tanker aircraft from Torrejon AFB in the Madrid area.

Officially sanctioned labor difficulties among the host country employees at our facilities, increased administrative controls and restrictions regarding the off-duty activities and privileges of US personnel, and direct host government harassment in the form of persistent prying into the details of all activities undertaken at a specific base are other actions the host government can take to dramatize its concerns about our activities or to gain greater control over what we do. The usual circumstance, however, is one in which we are confronted—in an ongoing negotiation—with a combination of demands and pressures which add up to an increase in the *quid pro quo* and a decrease in our freedom of action in usage, access, or presence. This has the effect of unbalancing the transaction, forcing us to take a new look at the value to us of proposed arrangements.

Restrictions on our operations are, of course, inversely proportional to the degree to which our activities are seen by the host government as contributing to its security or serving its interests. Obviously operations and activities which are seen to be directly related to the alliance served by the basing agreement give the host government minimal problems, however much our presence may at times be troublesome. Thus, normal activities aimed at maintaining our presence in and our commitment to the alliance area are least offensive. In some areas, they enjoy wide and continuing host government as well as public support.

Operations and training against the contingency of a thermonuclear exchange—even with all the sensitivity that entails—are also frequently free of host government restriction or concern, at least on a global basis so long as our actions are perceived to be prudent and in support of the basic purposes of the alliance; in this category are the activities of SAC tanker and bomber aircraft (notwithstanding sensitivities about possible accidents), as well as the routine ebb and flow of

our fleet ballistic missile submarines and their crews to and from the SSBN support facilities we maintain in the United Kingdom and Spain.

Host governments normally do not quarrel with routine US military operations and support activities in times of "normalcy," so long as a plausible rationale can be made linking the US activities with the requirements broadly of US overseas presence, i.e., forward deployment.

Also immune from undue host government anxiety on usage are military activities, operations, or exercises on which we and the host government have agreed specifically and which serve purposes and interests which are part of that agreement or on which we at least do not clash. These are fairly common, actually, and can relate to routine activities at a base or facility or even some to unusual usage not contemplated by the original agreement. In any event, these represent a special case of agreement, negotiation, or consultation with our hosts, *permitting host governments to exercise and to demonstrate control over what we do.*

Our most frequent difficulties arise when we are unable to obtain agreement from the host country on the mutuality of interest to be served by the activity or involvement we contemplate, either because time pressure does not permit adequate consultation or because our interest and the host government's actually do diverge and are unbridgeable regardless of the intensity of consultation. Even more difficult—as a special case of this type of situation—are those restrictions on usage which are based on the host nation's local or national or regional perceptions which are in conflict with or do not support our national or more global interests and concerns and activities (cf. Function III on page 17).

Our problems in supporting Israel in 1973 are again illustrative, but other illustrations are also available, including Thai sensitivity about the use of our facilities in Thailand for non-Southeast Asian contingencies, Japanese concerns about the range of purposes served by our facilities in Japan, Bahraini sensitivities about the possible uses of our modest Middle East force, British insistence on direct consultations on uses to which our British-based forces are put, and problems about the US use of facilities in Turkey and Greece growing out of their distress over what they perceive as our failure to acknowledge their special claims to our support on the Cyprus issue.

We are most sensitive to this kind of pressure in terms of our worldwide strategic lift requirements, for to the computers and planners involved in strategic lift planning, the world is one ball on the surface of which are a series of routes, ports, and staging areas—for aircraft and ships—which facilitate the transport of any commodity known to man, including the most complex support elements of a fighting machine. We can deal with the denial of some specific staging areas; usually we can reroute, as necessary, to fit the pattern of our political relationships, however uneconomic that may be. But in order for the system to work, there must be some certainty that various routings—especially around the middle of the globe—will remain available for rapid redeployment of assets, whether to support an emergency evacuation in Africa, an urgent movement of US materiel or forces to the Middle East, a quick redeployment of US troops from one theatre to another, the provision of emergency medical and other humanitarian supplies on an urgent basis to Central or South America, or the routine air shipment of other high-priority spares and parts. Such certainty does not exist at the present time. \*\*\*\*\*

*Forward Deployment and Basing – Prescriptions for the Future.* In looking even just a few years ahead, several broad observations can be made before looking to prescriptions or possible remedies. They may be stated as follows:

1. A strategy of forward defense remains today a viable posture for the United States, despite the leapfrogging impact of advances in the area of strategic bombardment. The Soviet Union's nearly global military capabilities, in fact, add a dimension not present in previous containment strategies.
2. A well-knit, geographically dispersed network of bases overseas, together with the forces to man and support them and the operating rights to use them efficiently, is an absolute necessity to support a strategy of forward defense on a global basis.
3. The United States has such an overseas basing system in being, but it is a network in decline in absolute numbers and a network under mounting constriction in usage and access in support of our wide-ranging global interests; our security assistance resources—important as part of the *quid pro quo* for basing—are also declining.
4. We are not yet at that point where pressure on our operating rights and access, contraction of the basing system as a whole, and decline in the resources we are prepared to budget for *quid pro quo* (as

well as for maintaining our own force structure), threaten our capability to defend our interests out there at the far perimeter.

5. But the day is not too far distant when that point may be reached, however strong we may remain in bases and in access in specific important regions and for specific contingencies, like those in the NATO area.

6. Finally, if we are to hold off this day of reckoning, we will not do so by continuing to act and operate the way we have—since 1948, at least—in the maintenance and usage of our basing system overseas. Policies, practices, and even a few traditions may have to change if we are to prolong the existence and the usefulness of our overseas basing structure, and thus extend the viability of our forward defense strategy.

All of this assumes, of course, that we cannot truly abandon our strategy of forward defense. The reality of American power and of the commitments we have undertaken, the growth and far-flung implications of Soviet military power, and the general world situation preclude a radical change in America's post-World War II strategy based on strong collective security agreements and forward, i.e., overseas, basing.

I assume equally that a major expansion of our basing network or major changes in our forward defense perimeter, particularly if it involves the possibility of new commitments, is simply out of step with the post-Watergate/post-Vietnam mood of the American people and their Congress. This effectively rules out as an option the possibility—except rarely—of replacing installations we have already given up, of improving significantly on what we now have, or of adding a little redundancy to the system as a hedge against an uncertain future and unforeseen contingencies. The expectation, over time, is for further contraction, not expansion. The difficulties the Administration faced in the Congress in funding even the modest proposals for Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, bear strong witness to this trend; so also do congressional pressures on security assistance budgeting.

Expansion possibilities also run up against hard questions of demonstrable need, among even those who normally favor high defense spending. It is genuinely difficult to make a persuasive case that we need more bases overseas, even acknowledging the difficulties of planning for unforeseen contingencies in areas where we have or are acquiring basing "blind" spots, such as in the eastern Mediterranean, parts of the Indian Ocean littoral, most of Africa, and parts of Latin America.

The answer, in part, to problems of changing technology and new or evolving contingencies would appear to lie not in expansion but rather in realignment, rationalization, and the achievement of greater reliability. For some contingencies, however, it may require that hardest of all hard decisions for us to make, that is acknowledgement, candidly, that we do not have at our immediate disposal the means to intervene with force to protect what we believe to be our interests in areas beyond those for which our general purpose forces and basing are structured. What then is required if we are to make the most of the forward basing system we now have in defense both against the newly global impulse of Soviet power as well as against the actions of others who would challenge or threaten our interests in places far from our shores?

Clearly, it seems to me that, as a matter of urgent national policy, we should reaffirm former Secretary Rogers' 1971 assertion<sup>26</sup> about the critical importance of our overseas basing structure, not just to our "foreign and security policies" overseas but to the security of the United States itself. We should, in every way possible, upgrade the attention we pay to this subject in both the Departments of State and Defense, concentrating our actions on several fronts at once:

(1) We should, for instance, make it a national policy goal to do what is required to retain and broaden the usefulness of the basing and operating rights structure we now enjoy by improving its political reliability and, where possible, reducing its political vulnerability;

(2) We should actively seek ways of reducing our dependence on overseas basing, while at the same time keeping our eyes open for optimizing our situation through alternative basing arrangements; and

(3) We should take a new and hard look at our own procedures, attitudes, patterns of operation, institutions, and planning with regard to overseas bases to better rationalize their use as vital *national* (not Service) assets and to force a continuing review of our real needs as a nation so as to be able better to differentiate those real and evolving needs from mere habit, convenience, Service bias, and occasional over-zealous concern about cost-effectiveness at the sacrifice of flexibility.

***Improving Reliability and Reducing Vulnerability.*** Reliability in this context means being able to count on using the installation when we want to do so, i.e., for purposes important to the United States; vulnerability refers not to the question of physical defense in time of war, which is a function more broadly of our war-fighting capabilities,

but rather to the matter of assuaging foreign national and sovereign sensitivities so as to minimize the effects of the "brambles and the thorns" of which Lao-tze spoke above.

This whole area is again highly political, and in politics it is believed often better to let sleeping dogs lie. So also in diplomacy and the law, where one is frequently confronted with strong and apparently sound arguments against opening lines of inquiry which do not appear: (1) absolutely necessary, (2) likely to produce a result more favorable to our purposes than that we now have. But what we now have may be illusory. As was noted earlier in this study, our overseas base and operating rights agreements were negotiated against the harsh and threatening outlines of the "cold war." So long as we and our hosts are not forced by the circumstances of a new crisis to look anew at our arrangements, the ambiguities which were there or which have crept in need not cause us difficulties. Routine transits of MAC aircraft and bunkering of ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC), the US merchant fleet, and the Navy itself—so essential to our overall force posture—pass unnoticed. But let a crisis erupt somewhere in the world, and we may find that we cannot count on unfettered use of facilities because of divergences in US and host nation attitudes and policies.

I acknowledge that in some instances it could be counter-productive to attempt, in the abstract, to sort out these issues with host countries. We might, in some cases, run the risk of actually raising new problems or introducing issues better left to resolution under the pressure of real-world crisis and real-world politics. But I submit that this is not universally the case. Obviously, we must choose our situations with care so as to maximize the chances of happy resolution and expanded understanding.

In other cases, however, we would be better off, I believe, were we candidly to recognize the ambiguities and limitations for what they are or have become, i.e., a potential cause for constraint or denial of facilities usage. We can then plan realistically for such situations, albeit continuing to work—through patient negotiations and full sharing of our concerns—toward broadening the areas of our mutual understanding and thereby improving the reliability of the facilities to serve our unilateral purposes.

This open approach is not to suggest public debate or discussion; to be successful, such discussions should be out of the public glare and free from the political pressures that public posturing can bring. I do have in mind, however, a policy of being totally and continuously open

with host governments about the uses to which we put our overseas facilities and the place those facilities have in our contingency plans. Many basing arrangements require this sort of openness as a minimum condition anyway; I would make it a part of all basing and facilities arrangements as a simple step to avoid the appearance of deception, cross purposes, and unacceptable risks.

As a corollary of this openness, I would also require a much higher standard of political consultation than is now the norm in our relations with nations hosting US facilities or forces. This is not meant to criticize any specific relationship; rather, it is intended only as a reminder that nationalism is a more potent force in the world today than it was when most of our basing arrangements were concluded. If we are to be able to continue to rely on bases and installations in foreign countries—whether important to everyday peacetime operations or to crisis/wartime capabilities—we simply must give more attention to the desires, the needs, and the sensibilities of the host nations on whose understanding, cooperation, and hospitality we depend. This does not mean supine acceptance of unreasonable restraints which get at the heart of our ability jointly to contribute to the collective security toward which the basing arrangement is pointed. Nor does it mean tame acceptance of fickle or venal demands of the moment. And it does not mean—necessarily—giving up important rights or activities simply because they have become controversial or a sensitive issue; that merely whets appetites for more concessions.

Rather, it means recognizing the absolutely vital importance to the United States of our existing base and operating rights arrangements as pieces of a global network which, as a whole, ensures *our* defense—a consideration more important necessarily to us than to any host country. It means working hard, however, to ensure that allies understand that bases are an important, almost inseparable, part of the alliance bargain we have struck; shirking on their portion of the defense burden we have agreed to share, if that involves restricting our activities, makes the basing, and the relationship, less valuable to us.

Our political consultation, moreover, must take on a more regular, a more ongoing, and a more substantial two-way quality than heretofore. This means taking our hosts into our confidence if we are to expect them in moments of crisis unrelated to their direct interests to understand our policies, problems, and objectives regarding base usage.

Reduction of vulnerability is the reciprocal of assuring and enhancing reliability. We should bargain hard and vigorously to get or

retain what we need by way of basing or operating rights. We should always ensure that we get value received for value given—and that we give value for value received—whatever the coin. But, we should also be extrasensitive to host country concerns on issues which smack of extraterritoriality. This means recognizing in all we do that we are not at home but rather in a foreign place whose residents and government have a right to expect us to be sensitive to their political, environmental, cultural, and other concerns. Specifically, this means flexibility and accommodation on those tough sovereignty issues so important to our hosts, rather than holding out—as a matter of custom or “principle”—on matters of privilege long out of date and frequently conceded in other places as a means of reducing vulnerability there to host government pressures and public attitudes resentful of our special treatment.

We should thus readily accept concepts of joint usage, of host government sovereignty within base areas, of the flying of host country flags, of the assignment of host country sentries, and of the appointment of host country base commanders. We should not resist the exercise of host country customs, public health, and postal powers on base areas merely because they have not been exercised previously—whatever the history. In all our actions, we should be guided by the principle that to the extent that bases and installations on foreign soil are perceived by the local populace to be theirs and to be serving their security needs rather than the exclusive preserve of rich foreigners serving only their own interests, we reduce the vulnerability of “our” installations to negative public opinion to which the host government must appear responsive. *Virtually none of the privileges we have is vital in terms of the real value of bases to us, and we should keep that in mind when we negotiate.*

In those areas or at times when the military association of our routine activities/forces—as in the logistics support of deployed forces—may pose problems, we should not shy away from imaginative solutions which meet host country sensitivities while permitting us the accomplishment of our mission. I refer, for instance, to the relative innocuousness of the various ships of the US Military Sealift Command (MSC), using commercial ports, manned by civilians, and in many ways appearing to be more civilian than military; and I contrast this with the “militaryness” of the aircraft of the USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC) in their Air Force livery, with their obviously military crews, and with their preference for the use of dedicated military facilities.

We occasionally assuage foreign sensitivities about the activities of

MAC aircraft by using civilian-type aircraft and painting them to appear as state rather than military aircraft. Why could we not use MAC chartered civilian aircraft and civilian airports more widely than we do? Why not consider revising the outward markings of the standard MAC C-141's and C-5A's so that they simply appear to be owned by the United States Government rather than part of the military forces of the United States? MAC crews are already accustomed to working in civilian clothes in many circumstances, not to deceive but merely to deemphasize their military association. And MAC aircraft configured for VIP service are already "demilitarized" in their appearance. Habit, tradition, convenience, and the price of new paint are, I suspect, the only real barriers to extending this practice to the rest of the fleet.

*Reducing Dependence on Foreign Basing.* We have, of course, been reducing our dependence on overseas basing for more than a decade, principally through the application of new technologies. Satellite communications and sensors are a highly dramatic illustration of this trend, enabling us to do without many of the overseas earth stations which were so important two decades ago. As has been noted above, a major decline in our dependence on overseas facilities has occurred in the strategic deterrence area, where modern weapons systems, based almost exclusively at sea or on US soil, have markedly reduced our dependence on overseas facilities.

The addition of an aerial refueling capability to the MAC fleet of C-141 transport aircraft, a modification now underway as part of the C-141 "stretch" program, the continued exercise of the already installed aerial refueling capability aboard the C-5A, and the planned development of a wide-body tanker-cargo aircraft will also go a long way toward reducing our dependence on air bases overseas to support our strategic airlift fleet. This is not to say that aerial refueling of strategic airlift aircraft, using only bases in the Western Hemisphere, would be an economical way to handle a large airlift to Europe or the Middle East; it is only to suggest the existence of a capability which can be exercised when needed and when worth the cost.

Increased attention to the Navy's urgent needs for modernizing underway replenishment forces is another important aspect of this effort to reduce dependence on fixed bases overseas. New ships are obviously needed. In the meantime it is within our power, imaginatively and realistically, to improve the flexibility of naval forces operating in forward areas without the benefit of fixed basing and in spite of shortages of ships specifically designed for fast underway replenishment.

The requirement for speedy transfer is, at its heart, a security one; in combat zones, speedy replenishment reduces the time period when replenishing forces are vulnerable to attack. Experiments have shown, however, that MSC ships can also conduct various types of underway replenishment—albeit slower in transfer and in speed of advance; larger amphibious ships have similar capabilities. In a peacetime mode, i.e., something other than the very real pressures and security concerns of task force operations like those in the Pacific in 1943-44, there is really no good reason—save our traditional ways and an element of combat realism in our training—why we cannot do more of this.

The aircraft carrier weapons system itself, especially in a limited war context, is a prime substitute in some areas for fixed airbases; combined with Marine amphibious capabilities, the system provides unique options for the projection of American influence and limited force in areas beyond the reach of our other forces. Nuclear power gives the carrier greater flexibility in remote areas where we have no assured port or aviation access. The carrier's cost, however, has skyrocketed; its reduced numbers have made targetting by our adversaries a far less difficult proposition than heretofore. And while nuclear power gives flexibility, so long as the aircraft on the deck depend on fossil fuels, a carrier engaging in sustained air operations cannot eliminate its dependence on the tankers and other supporting elements of the service "train."

In addition, the carrier's relatively new requirement for support by shore-based antisubmarine aircraft—an important element in its defense from sea-launched cruise missiles capable of being fired from great distances away—makes the system somewhat more dependent on fixed basing than heretofore, that is if it is to keep a respectable balance between offensive and defensive clout within its embarked air group.

Even acknowledging its shortcomings, maritime power, if properly supported and if used with imagination, offers one way of projecting presence in the gaps where overseas basing and support are not assured or where conditions deny us the use of existing facilities for specific US national purposes. This is a lesson the Soviet Navy is also learning, and Soviet construction of facilities at key locations around the world are an important element in support of the Soviet Navy's global thrust.

Beyond these ongoing trends and capabilities, it is important to note, as a Rand researcher recently did, that "there is no cheap or easy substitute for overseas bases. The taxpayer must either pay for it in terms of increased expenditures for additional forces . . . or else he buys less defense."<sup>27</sup>

Such already foreseen possibilities as large floating artificial island airbases or other support facilities built in shallow international waters using the technology of the off-shore oil rig, do not at this point appear feasible for employment in the near future as alternatives to bases ashore. Russian use of anchorages in international waters points in another direction which might offer some possible utility to US forces, but the practice does not suit our "steaming" style.

The search for suitable natural islands might also produce some results over time, especially if we find ourselves denied facilities in East Asia which are now so critical to our posture there and by comparison with which island spits appear so totally incomparable. Reservation of our rights at Tinian and Saipan are a hedge against the future in this respect, similar in some ways to our farsighted reservation, with the British, of space in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean two decades ago. Other island groups or terrain, especially those under UK or other Commonwealth control, should also be examined for their basing, staging, storage, and bunkering potential. But new bases, like the idea of prestocking equipments at forward locations, are very expensive and seem unlikely to command congressional support—if the debate over a modest \$33 million expenditure at Diego Garcia is instructive.

There are other possibilities as well. None appears totally satisfactory, but nearly all of them offer—with other suggestions like those above—a way of meeting specific commitments with fewer overseas basing assets. One of these has to do with reviewing our preference for dedicated airfields overseas, whether for tactical aviation or for strategic lift operations. Greater use of commercial airfields—especially in time of peace—should be possible without, for instance, degrading the capability of MAC to serve its primary purposes. It might, for instance, be possible through research to come up with a standardized, relatively inexpensive prefabricated cargo and passenger terminal facility which could be added economically to the corner of selected commercial airfields in friendly nations overseas. MAC already uses commercial airfields when military alternatives are not available, and MAC also uses civilian airliners for passenger charter work; what I propose is mainly an expansion of things already done.

Another concept which offers hope is that of the collocated base. In Europe, the USAF has developed the idea of making advance arrangements for the wartime use of selected host country military airfields to support additional aircraft we might commit to a European conflict. A survey, the subsequent working out of a specific agreement,

and the stocking at the fields of a relatively small amount of war reserve materials (WRM's) are all that need be done. This is a concept already in use by the Navy as well—in terms of prestocking of naval stores at selected overseas port facilities, but it may have even wider application for the Navy, especially in the Pacific.

*Improving Our Procedures, Planning, and Organization.* Habit, tradition, convenience, Service bias, and precedent are big barriers in this area too. For one thing, we tend almost always to regard our facilities overseas in terms of their service user; they are *Army* bases, *Navy* bases, or *Air Force* bases. In normal usage, day-to-day, and when they must be renegotiated at periodic intervals, they are looked upon bureaucratically in this parochial context rather than being regarded as *American* bases, facilities, or installations. Given the "log-rolling" working style of the JCS mechanism, this imposes a heavy negotiation requirement within the United States Government itself at nearly every turn, since the basing presence is perceived to have direct relevance to that most sensitive roles and missions arena of inter-Service politics. While there are notable exceptions to this rule, e.g., Keflavik in Iceland and Lajes in the Azores, too little consideration is given to the idea of joint US military use of overseas facilities.

This is not to suggest that joint use is a panacea for reducing the absolute number of facilities or for more cost-effective use of any facility. Location, terrain, and the specific purposes behind the establishment of a given base may well serve to limit joint Service usage. But too often, the possibility of such joint usage, especially of such facilities as air bases, is discounted rather than being considered as a reasonable and rational use of public funds. Habits like this die hard, but as our military budgets contract, we are going to have to find ways of exploiting the current system of overseas bases—and the smaller network that seems inevitable in the future—more effectively than heretofore.

We must look at our needs in the same light. Human beings are creatures of habit, and so are the institutions they forge. We seemingly have no way of assessing our real basing needs overseas except by the habits of the "cold war" years, the give-and-take of bureaucratic politics within our system, and the demands and opportunities for reduction and realignment made by our hosts, by technology, by changing requirements, and by the budget process. Over the years we have grown accustomed to having facilities overseas as a matter of operational convenience. Most facilities and bases were established to satisfy a specific operational military requirement. Over time, and in common with our well-known tendency in weapons systems, we have found it convenient,

indeed tempting, to add functions to facilities already in being. This is both cost-effective and bureaucratically useful, since it makes more effective use of established facilities while at the same time enhancing their value—hence their defensibility—at budget time.

Often, with changes in operating patterns or in technology or in the threat, some of these functions become outdated; add-on functions come to equal or outweigh the original purpose for which the base was established. Lajes Field in the Azores is a good illustration. Originally valued as a mid-Atlantic “pit stop” for propeller-driven aircraft in World War II, it retained much of this value even into the longer-range jet age, e.g., its use by our strategic airlift forces in such situations as the Israeli airlift of 1973. But it has also become equally valued, perhaps even more importantly, as a support base for long-range maritime surveillance aircraft used by the Navy to keep tabs on the Soviet submarines operating in the mid-Atlantic.

And the existence of an airfield of any substantial dimensions—however limited in its inception to tactical or strategic bombardment purposes—can become an important latter day “coaling station” for a nation like the United States committed to a worldwide deployment of forces and prepared for other reasons to maintain a costly strategic airlift capability in support of this commitment. Thus, because we have a wartime requirement for the airlift assets, and because our MAC crews require flying hours to maintain their proficiency for a potential wartime operating pace, we use the relatively more expensive airlift capability we have in being for a variety of routine support missions not really requiring the unique timeliness of aircraft delivery. We maintain centralized aircraft engine overhaul, using MAC aircraft to ferry engines all over the world. This too may be cost-effective; it may be convenient. But this add-on function, plus Service bias, begins to clutter up our judgment when we are called upon, in a negotiating situation, to assess the relative value of the facilities we operate in a given country so that we may be sure we are bargaining hard for those which are, in fact, those we value most.

Our posture is too frequently one of undifferentiated status quoism. And for want of the capability or willingness ourselves to prioritize as among various activities and facilities, we frequently find ourselves unable bureaucratically to set our own priorities. This can lead to inflexibility in bargaining; it can also lead to reluctant acceptance of the host country's priorities and agenda when it comes time to renegotiate our agreements governing the use of facilities.

Added to this is the problem that within the military services, the matter of overseas basing is most often an operational rather than a planning concern, so that the longer-range look at needs and priorities—and the correlation of these needs and priorities with changing political and budgetary circumstances and with new technologies—is hamstrung by the “operator’s” preoccupation with solving his immediate problem and his tendency also to hang on to anything he already has as a hedge against an uncertain future and as a protection against bureaucratic second-guessing.

Within the State Department, which normally heads negotiations for new base and security agreements, the purview can often be equally parochial, reflecting not the broadest view of American interests as a global power but rather the more narrow views of desk officers and country directors whose bureaucratic responsibilities are no broader than the bilateral relationship or the regional concerns with which they are charged.

Our procedures for dealing with basing and with base negotiations are as haphazard as the evolution of the structure itself. We routinely regard the business of base negotiations from a *status quo* point of view, in almost all instances, putting the host country with which we are negotiating in the position of being *demandeur*. We also tend to look upon base negotiations in a spasmodic, *ad hoc* way, rather than as a continuing process with global implications.

Our institutional framework in this area is poor—despite our national predilection for seeking organizational solutions to substantive problems. We have no hard institutionalized procedures or institutions for reconciling these various short-range, parochial, and operationally oriented views into the kind of comprehensive long-range military and foreign policy planning we require if we are to make the most efficient use of the slowly dwindling complex of bases and base rights we now have overseas. Our planners too frequently succumb to the temptation of being where the action, and the action officers, are. Beyond this, we urgently require the development of a trained body of experienced, senior-level negotiators capable of reconciling the various bureaucratic interests noted above so that we can deal with basing as a global problem and as a global system—changes in any part of which can have serious impacts elsewhere. The world is too small, and our interests too broad, to permit the luxury of an *ad hoc* basing and planning and negotiating focus which is less than global in its scope. Our needs are too great, and the stakes too high, to allow the prolongation of the too often cavalier, parochial, and rigidly bureaucratic approaches we bring to the whole area of forward basing—and ultimately to the strategy of forward defense.

\*Several distinctions are possible between the words "base" and "facility." The one with which I am most comfortable relates to both size and tenancy: a base is normally a larger complex with both operating and support personnel assigned; a facility tends to be smaller, more limited in function, and with few if any operating personnel regularly resident. Ramstein AFB and Rota are bases; Diego Garcia is a facility. The word "installation" is almost generic; it can apply to both.

\*\*The word *detente* had its limitations even before the Ford Administration abandoned its use in early 1976; it suggests more relaxation of tensions than it should and does not have the full flavor of continuing struggle about it. In the context of this paper, however, and with these qualifications understood, it is infinitely preferable than any other formulation floating about as a shorthand expression to capture a mood and a series of moves, all of which seem to have reduced the chances of a cataclysmic thermonuclear exchange between the two superpowers.

\*\*\*It may also be useful to note that there are subtle differences in nuance among the Services regarding forward deployment. To the Army, for instance, "forward deployment" connotes large numbered ground force units concentrated chiefly in West Germany and in South Korea. To the Navy, "forward deployment" is visually more descriptive since it commonly refers to naval and air units deployed on a rotational basis to the European or Pacific theaters, usually in some relationship to the Sixth and Seventh Fleets and almost always without dependents who remain behind at a homebase or homeport in the US. For the Air Force, "forward deployment" suggests a mix of both. Units of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) deploy and operate abroad on a temporary basis from homebases in the US/other USAF units, such as those from the Tactical Air Command (TAC), may deploy temporarily or be assigned abroad as part of numbered tactical air forces based in the European and Pacific theaters.

\*\*\*\*The new basing agreement with Spain, reported in the *New York Times* on page one of its 25 January 1976 edition, calls for a phaseout of the SSBN's from Rota to be completed by mid-July 1979. See also testimony before SFRC by Ambassador McCloskey (Washington Post, 18 May 1976, p. 1) in which withdrawal of SSBN's from Rota was keyed to advent of first elements of TRIDENT SSBN series in 1979.

\*\*\*\*\*Wartime operations, in an alliance context, are assumed to pose few discernible difficulties. The glue of the alliance, reinforced by shared and direct threat, would presumably open up usage matters; however, they may remain complicated elsewhere by the legal rights and obligations, under international law, of nations choosing to remain neutral.

## FOOTNOTES

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